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In accordance with the Court's direction at the September 9, 2016 hearing, Arista respectfully submits this brief, limited to one-and-a-half pages (*see* ECF 516 at 72:14-73:1), regarding the right to a jury trial on Cisco's claim for disgorgement of profits after *Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer*, *Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).

Prior to *Petrella*, the U.S. Supreme Court had never addressed whether disgorgement of profits under the Copyright Act was a legal or equitable remedy. Thus, courts were inconsistent in their treatment of disgorgement claims. *Petrella*, however, settled the question. There, the Supreme Court—in assessing whether the equitable defense of laches could bar claims for infringement—reviewed the types of relief available under the Copyright Act. *Id.* at 1967–68. It held that, although recovery of profits "is not easily characterized as legal or equitable," "in this case," it is a form of equitable relief. *Id.* at 1967 n.1

Petrella therefore "place[d] recovery of profits squarely on the equitable side of the ledger." 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 12.06[B][3][d][i], at 12-160.4 (emphasis added). And after Petrella, the only court to decide whether the court or the jury would decide copyright disgorgement held that the court would do so. In Fahmy v. Jay-Z, No. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139298, Case No. 2:07-cv-05715-CAS (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2015), Judge Snyder in the Central District of California ruled that "in light of Petrella it appears that the appropriate course is to treat the award of profits as an equitable remedy," and "[t]herefore, the Court will calculate the amount [of] profits, if any, to be awarded pursuant to §504(b)." Id. at *3.

Cisco may argue that *Petrella*'s use of the phrase "in this case" implies that there may be copyright cases where disgorgement is deemed legal rather than equitable. But that misconstrues the opinion—reading the statement as a whole, "in this case" refers to disgorgement *under the Copyright Act*, not to the particular facts before the Court, which the Court did not even allude to.

Accordingly, to the extent Cisco cites pre-*Petrella* cases to support its claim that disgorgement is a legal remedy (as it did at the September 9 hearing), those cases are no longer good law.

As the Court noted at the September 9 hearing, Judge Alsup recently considered copyright disgorgement in *Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA, but he deferred "rul[ing] on the *Petrella* issue" until after the verdict, *see* May 3, 2016 Order (ECF 1789), and because Google prevailed on liability, he never reached the issue. In meet-and-confer, Cisco asserted that other post-*Petrella* cases have given disgorgement to the jury, but it did not identify any, and Arista has reviewed the cases that cite *Petrella* and found none. Thus, if such a case exists, it presumably does not apply *Petrella*'s teachings, and should be given no weight.

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In any event, even if it were permissible to deem copyright disgorgement a legal remedy in
specific cases, there would be no reason to do so here, and the Court is clearly within its authority
to find it equitable. See 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 12.06[B][3][d][i], at 12-160.4 (noting that "it
seems best to follow the Supreme Court majority's lead [in Petrella] by presumptively treating
profits as equitable in nature.").
Indeed, as the Court observed at the September 9 hearing, disgorgement of profits has

traditionally and repeatedly been characterized as equitable. *See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry*, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990) (noting that the Supreme Court characterizes damages as "equitable where they are restitutionary, such as in actions for disgorgement of improper profits") (internal quotations and citations omitted)); *Fifty-Six Hope Road Music, Ltd. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc.*, 778 F.3d 1059, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) ("A claim for disgorgement of profits under § 1117(a) is equitable, not legal."); *SEC v. Jasper,* 678 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Ninth Circuit law is clear that the reimbursement provision of SOX 304 is considered an equitable disgorgement remedy and not a legal penalty."); *Myers v. Merrill Lynch & Co.*, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22642, *16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1999) ("Section 17203 provides the remedies that are available in § 17200 claims (equitable relief including injunctions and disgorgement).").

18 Respectfully submitted

19 Dated: September 16, 2016 KEKER & VAN NEST LLP

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